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ANOTHER ATTEMPT AT PATENT REFORM:
S.1013 THE PATENT ABUSE REDUCTION ACT OF 2013
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of shoot-from-the-hip lawsuits brought by essentially
faceless licensing entities, without any significant thought of
whether the lawsuit or underlying patent has any merit, seems
outrageous to society. But these suits do happen, and when they
do, people pay for them to go away because the cost of settlement
is often less than the cost of litigation. Congress has introduced a
significant amount of new patent legislation in an attempt to curve
these sometimes meritless patent suits where defendants will settle
merely to avoid litigation costs. But the challenge with trying to
regulate these suits is finding the balance of curtailing abuses
while at the same time not unduly undermining the rights of patent
owners who have legitimate suits, whether those patent owners are
practicing or not. A non-practicing entity is not necessarily a bad
actor that is harmful to society and banning non-practicing entities
all together would undermine the rights of patent owners and the
value of patents generally because there are instances where
licensing is a legitimate exploitation of patent rights.
One of the most recent Congressional attempts to curb NPEs
abusing the patent litigation process for profit is the Patent Abuse
Reduction Act ("PARA" or "Bill"). Unlike previous attempts that
only focused on changing one aspect of litigation procedure, this
Bill is the most expansive by focusing on all the procedural areas
that are most often abused. The Bill's counter-measures include
(1) expansive pleading requirements, (2) modified joinder, (3)
limits on discovery, and (4) a "loser pays" system for patent
litigation
The PARA should not be enacted because a bill as
comprehensive as the PARA will bar meritless suits at the expense
of barring too many with merit. Increased pleading requirements
will not allow good faith actors to take advantage of sometimes
much needed discovery to learn how a potentially infringing
product actually works. As technology advances, plaintiffs will
become more reliant on discovery because more potentially
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infringing devices rely on computer processes that are not easily
reverse engineered.
Section II of this article will give background to set up the
circumstances in which the PARA was introduced, beginning with
Part A which provides a background on "Patent Trolls" and lays
out both (1) a brief history of "Patent Trolls" and (2) how these
entities operate today. Part B gives a very brief introduction to
patent litigation, specifically the procedures that would be affected
by the PARA including (1) pleading requirements, (2) claim
construction, and (3) awarding of attorney's fees and costs. Part C
summarizes legislation that either has been passed or introduced
recently to curtail abusive patent litigation by "Patent Trolls."
Section III will examine the PARA itself and provide a brief
synopsis of the Bill's provisions. Section IV analyzes each section
of the PARA to determine what Congress is actually trying to
regulate in the provisions and how the regulation would actually
affect abusive patent litigation. Parts A through D examine each
of the four major procedural changes proposed by the PARA.
Section E describes a position that does not get very much
attention: opponents of NPE regulation. The article concludes
with Section V, which details why the Bill should not be enacted
because it is far too sweeping regulation that would have a
negative effect on patent owners who assert their patents in good
faith.
II. BACKGROUND
Before discussing the Patent Abuse Reduction Act ("PARA" or
"Bill"), it is useful to have a background on the current landscape
in the patent monetization area. This section will introduce non-
practicing entities, look to how they operate, outline current patent
litigation procedures, and briefly discuss Congress's attempts to
curtail the rapid expansion of licensing and litigation campaigns
brought by "patent trolls."
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A. The "Patent Troll" Landscape
The term "patent troll" was originally coined by Peter Detkin, a
former assistant counsel at Intel.' Mr. Detkin described a patent
troll as "somebody who tries to make a lot of money off a patent
that they are not practicing and have no intention of practicing and
in most cases never practiced."2 Nowadays, the term patent troll is
often used to refer to a Non-Practicing Entity ("NPE"), which are
firms that, as their name suggests, buy patents without any
intention of "practicing" the invention.? Rather than using a patent
to produce and sell a product to the exclusion of others, NPEs
prefer to go on aggressive licensing and litigation campaigns
targeting any end user of the patented technology.' Further, NPEs
usually acquire older patents to use on new technology and often
"spring" up to enforce their patents against unsuspecting
companies, much like the troll from the tale of the Billy Goats
Gruff "sprang" up onto unsuspecting children.
1. Interestingly, after his time at Intel, Mr. Detkin became a co-founder and
managing director at Intellectual Ventures: a notorious "patent troll." See Peter
Detkin, Leveling the Patent Playing Field, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP.
L. 636 (2007); Terrence McMahon, Stephen Akerley & Jane Bu, Who is a Troll?
Not a Simple Answer, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 159, 159 (2006).
2. Terrence McMahon, Stephen Akerley & Jane Bu, Who is a Troll? Not a
Simple Answer, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 159, 159 (2006).
3. Generally, NPE is the more polite term used to refer to a "patent troll."
However, some have argued that the term "Non-Practicing Entity" does not
accurately depict the type of entity that, some say, abuse the patent system. Sara
Jeruss, Robin Feldman, & Joshua Walker, The America Invents Act 500: Effects
of Patent Monetization Entities on U.S. Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
357, 366-69 (2012) (arguing that there are several more apt terms, such as,
"Patent Monetization Entity" that would be a more accurate description of a
"patent troll"). For example, a university could fit into the broad "NPE" term
because universities often prefer to license their patents instead of "practicing"
them. Id. Most would not think that universities stifle innovation by abusing the
patent system. However, for the purposes of this article, NPE will still be used
as it is the current, most widely used term to refer to a "patent troll."; McMahon,
supra, note 1, at 159-166.
4. See McMahon, supra, note 1.
5. Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy
Against Patent Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH, L.J. 159,
166 (2006).
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1. Early "Patent Trolls"
The type of behavior exhibited by "patent trolls" is not a new
practice. Using patents to "rent seek" has been a practice of
entities since the late 18th century.6 Choosing to license a patent,
rather than use it to "practice" an invention, to generate revenue
has been a strategy of many inventors since the start of the U.S.
patent system.7 In fact, some believe that the one of the first
"patent trolls" was Eli Whitney, the inventor of the cotton gin.8
Whitney's first attempts of manufacturing and selling the cotton
gin proved to be commercially unsuccessful, forcing Whitney to
sue plantation owners that used Whitney's patented gin in order
profit from his invention.9
One of the most notorious instances of early "patent trolling"
was patent attorney George Selden's assertion of his patent on the
automobile during the early 1900s."o Selden first filed his patent in
1879 when the idea of an automobile was circulating, but nobody
had the capability to make one." Selden took advantage of the
patent laws at the time and did not actually choose to issue his
patent until 1895.12 After the patent issued, with the help of some
investors, Selden sued nearly every automobile manufacturer in
6. See Robert Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent Seeking,
and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1592 (2009) (noting
that, after the Patent Act of 1793, the costs of patent litigation soared, creating
incentive to "rent seek").
7. Robert H. Resis , History of the Patent Troll and Lessons Learned, 17
INTELL. PROP. LITIG. 1, Vol. 17, No. 2 at 16 (2006), available at
http://www.bannerwitcoff.com/_docs/library/articles/HistoryOfPatentTroll.pdf
8. Id.
9. Id. Whitney's efforts did not turn out fruitful as he faced the slow moving
courts of the south that were not apt to grant him "speedy justice." Id. All the
money he eventually gained from lawsuits ended up going toward costly
attorney's fees, leaving the inventor of the cotton gin penny less. Id. This
historical account only underscores the importance of a favorable venue to a
"patent troll," which will be discussed later in this article.
10. Richard Snow, The Father of All Patent Trolls, FORBES (July30, 2013
11:13 AM), www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/20 13/07/30/the-
father-of-all-patent-trolls.
11. Id.
12. Id.
370
4
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 5
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol24/iss2/5
2014] ANOTHER A TTEMPTATPA TENT REFORM
the United States for patent infringement, and was quite successful
in obtaining licenses.13 This success ended, however, when he
sued Henry Ford, who had no intention of licensing Selden's
patent and vigorously fought the suit.14 Ford eventually won on
appeal, with the appellate judge ruling that "every element in the
claim was old and the combination itself was not new" and that
neither Ford nor any other car maker owed Selden anything."
2. Non-Practicing Entities Today
Today, NPEs acquire their patent assets by purchasing patents
from universities, corporations, governments, research labs, and
individual inventors." But NPEs have developed an
organizational web so that often the acquiring company does not
have any intention of keeping the patent. Larger NPEs will then
typically assign their newly acquired patents or exclusive licenses
to a number of shell companies." In fact, the largest NPEs may
own over a thousand shell companies holding thousands of patents
and patent applications." An advantage to using such a large
amount of shell companies to enforce its patents is that the
complex web of shell companies and subsidiaries is hard to make
sense of, which consequently makes NPEs harder to litigate
against.' This is, in large part, because Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 7.1 does not require litigants to disclose their
parent corporation or any other equity holder unless that entity
holds more than 10% of the shell company's stock.20 Also, it is
13. Id.
14. Id
15. Id
16. Robin Feldman & Tom Ewing, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN,
TECH. L. REv. 1, 1 36 (2012).
17. Id.T21.
18. Id. 25. The NPE Intellectual Ventures is said to have 1276 shell
companies holding 8000 U.S. patents and 3000 U.S. patent applications. Id.
19. Id. 195.
20. Id. 200.
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hard to litigate against the larger parent NPE for a shell company's
actions because courts are hesitant to "pierce the corporate veil." 21
As a further advantage, NPE entities are generally incorporated
in a way that creates significant forum advantages in potential
litigation through the limitation of the forum to a single favorable
jurisdiction.22 Incorporating a shell in a favorable forum and
establishing the principle place of business and registered agent for
that entity in that same forum easily accomplish establishing one
appropriate venue. 23  This structure causes there to be personal
jurisdiction in only one jurisdiction, making there be only one
appropriate venue for litigation.
All of these factors combine to make it very difficult to litigate
against the shell corporations and even more difficult to access the
deep pockets of the parent NPE.24 This is especially true when the
parent NPE or NPE backed investment fund are only shareholders,
which creates a slight connection that "effectively render[s] almost
no one [financially] responsible for [the shell's] actions."25
NPEs are also in a better position than companies that operate
their own patents. In an average operating company versus
operating company patent infringement suit, the defendant
operating company will usually assert their own patents against the
plaintiffs, which often leads to a cross-license settlement.2 6
However, in a NPE versus operating company patent infringement
suit, instead of defensively asserting their own patents to induce a
quick cross-licensing settlement, defendant operating companies
are faced with the decision of paying extremely high patent
21. Id. 210. A plaintiff may "pierce the corporate veil," or hold a parent
company liable for its subsidiaries actions, when the parent company uses such
a parent-subsidiary structure "to accomplish certain wrongful purposes, most
notable fraud, on the shareholder's behalf" United States v. Best Foods, 524
U.S. 51, 62 (1998).
22. Robin Feldman & Tom Ewing, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN,
TECH. L. REv. 1, 1198 (2012).
23. Id. For example, Searete LLC, a shell of the notorious troll Intellectual
Ventures, is a Delaware LLC with a presence and manager in Nevada. Id.
2 4. Id.
25. Id.
26. McMahon, supra note 1, at 166.
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litigation costs to defend their patent or quickly settle with the
NPE to avoid such costs. 27
Under the current laws, the creation of NPEs and the filing of
patent infringement lawsuits by NPEs have skyrocketed over the
last couple of years.28 A recent study shows that patent
infringement cases filed by NPEs have risen from 22 percent of all
patent infringement cases to 40 percent of all infringement cases
from 2007 to 2011 29 Additionally, it is estimated that defendants
in NPE suits have lost over $83 billion in wealth per year over
recent years.3 ' These numbers have caused both Congress and
President Obama to take notice and try to reform the patent
system.
B. Patent Litigation Procedure
Patent litigation is an extremely complex form of civil litigation.
In fact, most jurisdictions supply litigants with procedural local
patent rules to supplement the district's local rules and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP"). This section will detail the
aspects of patent litigation that are most relevant to the PARA:
pleading requirements, claim construction hearings, and awarding
of attorney's fees in an "exceptional" case.
27. Id.
28. Jeruss, supra note 3, at 388.
29. Id. The study also notes that out of the five top litigation filers for this
period, four were NPEs. Id.
30. James Bessen, Jennifer Ford, and Michael J. Meurer, The Private and
Social Costs of Patent Trolls, 30 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper
No. 11-45, 2011). It is also estimated that a defendant in a patent lawsuit
brought by a NPE suffers a median $20.4 million decline in stock value. Id. at
30.
31. FACT SHEET White House Task Force on High-Tech Patent Issues,
THE WHITE HoUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent-issues
(last visited July 28, 2013) (calling on Congress to stop the "drain on the
American economy" that frivolous patent litigation creates).
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1. Pleading Requirements
The FRCP's pleading requirements are simple: a pleader must
provide a short and plain statement showing that the court has
proper jurisdiction, he is entitled to relief, and the type of relief
sought.32 Additionally, the FRCP provides Form 18 - a model
complaint for patent infringement which requires the plaintiff "to
1) allege ownership of the patent; 2) name each defendant; 3) cite
the patent that is allegedly infringed; 4) state the means by which
the defendant allegedly infringes; and 5) point to the section of the
patent law invoked."33 However, Form 18 has only been approved
for direct infringement; a plaintiff may need to plead more with
respect to indirect infringement in order to overcome a motion to
dismiss.34 Therefore, if inducement or contributory infringement is
pleaded, the pleader must be mindful of the Twombly/Iqbal
"plausibility" standard in order to survive a motion to dismiss.
2. Claim Construction
Patent claims are often written with broad and ambiguous
language in order for the patentee to ensure that his claim cover
the most embodiments of his invention as possible. For, if a claim
contains narrow language, a competitor can easily design around
the claim to avoid infringement. 6 Claim construction is the task of
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The only formal exception to these pleading
requirements can be found in Rule 9(b), which provides for a heightened
pleading requirement for fraud cases. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. Form 18.
34. Robert Pollock, Confusion Over Patent Infringement Pleading and Form
18, LAW 360 (Sept. 4, 2013 6:22 PM),
http://www.1aw360.com/articles/424022/confusion-over-patent-infringement-
pleading-and-form-18.
35. See In re Bill of Landing Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig.,
681 F.3d 1323, 1341-47 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (performing a Twombly/Iqbal analysis
on each of plaintiffs claims for inducement). Further, infringement by
inducement under 35 U.S.C. 217(b) occurs when the defendant "knowingly
induced infringement and possessed specific intent to encourage another's
infringement." Id. at 1339.
36. Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C.L. REv.
379, 389 (2012). The article noted that "[w]hen courts have found that a patent
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interpreting a claim in a patent to determine the scope of each
contested term. In Markman v. Westview Instruments, a
unanimous Supreme Court held that claim construction was
strictly a question of law for the judge, not a question of fact for
the jury.17  Since that decision, after discovery in a patent
infringement suit, the parties participate in a Markman hearing,
where a District Court judge will hear each party's contesting
definitions of terms in a patent claim and interpret those terms as a
matter of law."
3. Awarding ofAttorney's Fees and Sanctions
In a patent infringement suit, awarding of attorney's fees and
costs is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 285, which reads that attorney's
fees and costs will be award if the case is "exceptional."
Currently, awarding attorney's fees and costs to a prevailing party
is a two-step process. 39 A district court must (1) determine if the
case is exceptional by clear and convincing evidence, and (2)
determine whether awarding attorney's fees is appropriate and
how much that award should be.40 Further, sanctions under §285
may be awarded to the defendant if both (1) the plaintiff brought
the litigation in bad faith and (2) the litigation was objectively
baseless.4 1
is a pioneer ... courts customarily reward the inventor with a broad range of
equivalents, thereby permitting her to claim ownership of technology lying
substantially beyond the literal scope of her claims."
37. Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
38. 18 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 18.06 (2013). A
Markman hearing must be had before trial in a jury trial. Id. However, in a
bench trial, the judge can make claim construction determinations during the
actual trial. Id.
39. Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1324.
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C. Recent Legislative Efforts to Curtail
Non-Practicing Entities
1. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
The most recently enacted bill in the patent area is the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act ("AIA"), which was signed into law by
President Obama on September 16, 2011 42 The AIA is most
known for expanding the definition of "prior art" and changing the
U.S. patent system from a "first to invent" system to a "first to
file" system.43 However, the section relevant to this discussion is a
smaller section tucked away toward the end of the bill: new
limitations of joinder."
Generally, § 19(d) of the AIA seeks to limit joinder of
defendants to a suit to parties that allegedly infringed the
plaintiffs patent(s) in the same transaction as the original
defendant.4 5 Additionally, there must be questions of fact common
to all defendants being joined to the suit.4 6 These new limitations
on joinder are designed to address the joinder of multiple
defendants "who have tenuous connection to the underlying
disputes."47 Joining multiple parties to a suit is a strategy mainly
employed by NPEs in order to reduce litigation costs by litigating
certain issues once rather than across multiple suits.48 Also,
joining multiple defendants to an action helps secure a venue
favorable to the plaintiff because a motion to transfer venue is less
likely to be successful when a large number of defendants are
involved.49 For example, many NPEs would file in or transfer their
suits to the Eastern District of Texas, known as the "center of the
42. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011).
43. Id.
44. Id. § 19(d); 35 U.S.C. § 299 (West).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 54-55 (2011).
48. Tracie Bryant, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting
Joinder, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 687, 691 (2012).
49. Id.
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patent litigation universe."" The Eastern District of Texas has
been favorable to plaintiffs for a number of reasons, some of
which are the venues notorious "rocket docket," historically
plaintiff friendly juries, and the Judges' tendency not to grant a
motion to transfer venue." Therefore, NPEs favor this jurisdiction
because it allows them to litigate more quickly, avoid being
transferred to unfavorable jurisdictions, and the potential of a high
jury award if the case ever went to trial.
While the joinder limitation of the AIA is a first step in
curtailing the large amount of cases brought by NPEs, it only
attempts to eliminate one of the many tactics that NPEs use in
litigation.5 2 Also, NPEs can get around the new joinder limitation
by filing multiple suits against different parties in the same District
and filing a motion to consolidate."
50. Mark Liang, The Aftermath of TS Tech: The End of Forum Shopping in
Patent Litigation and Implications for Non-Practicing Entities, 19 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 29, 39 (2010). There were 332 patent infringement suits filed in the
Eastern District of Texas in 2007. Id. at 42. The Northern District of California
was second with 156 cases filed. Id.
51. Id. at 43-49. A case in the Eastern District of Texas will only take about
12 months to go from filing to trial, whereas the national average for the same
period of time is two years. Id. at 44. This quick turnaround saves NPEs money
in litigation costs and attorney's fees. Id. Further, a defendant is left to quickly
scramble to put a case together while the NPE has the advantage of putting a
case together before the case is filed. Id. at 45. With respect to juries, the
plaintiff win rate in the Eastern District of Texas in a patent infringement suit is
around 90%, well above the national average of 68%. Id. at 46. Commentators
speculate that this may be because the jury pool in the Eastern District of Texas
is statistically elderly and uneducated, which may make them less likely to
understand the technology or policy arguments involved in a particular suit. Id.
Finally, the Eastern District only grants a third of the motions to transfer venue
filed, while nationally, half the motions are granted. Id at 46.
52. Holly Forsberg, Diminishing the Attractiveness of Trolling: The Impacts
of Recent Judicial Activity on Non-Practicing Entities, 12 PGH. J. TECH. L. &
POL'Y 4, 40(2011).
53. See Jeruss, supra note 3, at 380; E.D. Tex. Pat. R. 2-6 (stating that
"[s]eparately filed cases related to the same patent shall be assigned to the same
judge, i.e., the judge assigned to the first case"); N.D. Ill. LR40.4 (stating that
"[c]ases will be consolidated if, among other factors, "the handling of both cases
by the same judge is likely to result in a substantial saving of judicial time and
effort").
377
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2. The Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal
Disputes Act
The Saving High Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal
Disputes ("SHIELD") Act failed to be enacted during the 112th
Congress, but an expanded version of the act was re-introduced by
Rep. Peter DeFazio [D-OR] to the 113th Congress on Feb 27,
2013.54 The purpose of introducing the SHIELD Act is to "force
patent trolls to take financial responsibility for frivolous
lawsuits."" The SHIELD Act of 2013 is in the House Judiciary
Committee, but is not likely to advance from this Committee.56
The SHIELD Act implicitly targets NPEs by forcing such an
entity to pay all reasonable costs and attorney's fees to the adverse
party if there is a judgment against the NPE.17 Specifically, after a
party has moved for a judgment on either invalidly or non-
infringement, the adverse party must prove that it either (1) is the
original inventor, (2) has made a substantial investment in the
exploitation of the patent through production or sale, or (3) is a
university or technology transfer organization." Essentially, the
SHIELD Act attempts to take away the threat of high patent
litigation costs when sued by a NPE, thus reducing the incentive
for a defendant to settle on especially questionable infringement
claims brought by NPEs.
54. H.R. 6245 (112th): Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal
Disputes Act of 2012, GovTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/l 13/hr845 (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
55. DeFazio-Chaffetz Introduce Expanded SHIELD Act To Combat Patent
Trolls, CONGRESSMAN PETER DEFAzIO,
http://defazio.house.gov/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=8 11 &I
temid=144 (last visited July 28, 2013).
56. ,H.R. 6245 (112th): Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal
Disputes Act of 2012, supra note 55.
57. See Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of
2012, H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter "SHIELD Act of 2012"].
58. SHIELD Act of 2012, supra note 56. A technology transfer organization
is defined as an organization "whose primary purpose is to facilitate the
commercialization of technology developed by one or more institutions of
higher education." Id.
378
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3. The End Anonymous Patents Act
The End Anonymous Patents Act ("EAPA") was introduced to
the House of Representatives on May 16, 2013 by Rep. Theodore
Deutch [D-FL] and was referred to the House Committee on the
Judiciary on the same day." The EAPA was introduced with the
purpose of "bringing much needed transparency to our current
patents system."6 0 The operative provisions of the EAPA attempt
to reduce the common NPE secrecy tactics of using multiple shell
companies to hide the keep the true owner of a patent a secret.6'
The EAPA requires parties to disclose the owner of a patent and
any party that has an interest in the patent to the USPTO upon the
patent's issuance.62 The same disclosure would also be required
whenever the patent's maintenance fees are paid and whenever the
patent transfers ownership in any way. If a patent holder fails to
comply with any of the above requirements, the EAPA would limit
damages in a patent infringement suit to after the date the
requirements were met.'
4. The Stopping the Offensive Use of Patents Act
The Stopping the Offensive Use of Patents Act ("STOP Act")
was introduced to the House of Representatives by Rep. Darrell
Issa [R-CA] and Rep. Judy Chu [D-CA], after the PARA, on July
22, 2013." The STOP Act was referred to the House Committee
59. H.R. 2024 (113th): End Anonymous Patents Act, GovTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr2024 (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
60. Id.
61. See Feldman, supra note 16, 127.
62. End Anonymous Patents Act, H.R. 2024, 113th Cong. (2013). For the
purposes of this Act, an "interested party" is "(A) any entity that has the legal
right to enforce the patent through an infringement action; (B) any ultimate
parent entity of an entity described in (A); and (C) any entity that has a
controlling interest in the enforcement of the patent, including any ultimate
parent entity not included under (A) or (B)." Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. H.R. 2766 (113th): STOP Act, GovTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr2766 (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
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on the Judiciary on the same day.66 The STOP Act was introduced
to "deter abuse and arm smaller entities with the support they need
to fight back" against NPEs.67 The STOP Act is an example of
how Congress is also trying to combat NPEs through preempting a
NPE suit through patent prosecution by creating means for a
NPE's patent to be invalidated.
The STOP Act's purpose is to "make improvements to the
transitional program for covered business method patents, and for
other purposes."" Accordingly, the STOP Act amends 35 U.S.C.
§ 321 (§ 18 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act) to make the
post grant review provision of that section permanent by
eliminating subsection (a) paragraph (3) of the notes, thus making
the "Business Method Transitional Program" permanent.69 The
AIA's "Business Method Transitional Program" allows anyone
who is sued by a party with a "business method patent" to apply
for a post-grant review of the patent at the United States Patent and
Trademark Office within nine months. 7o Removal of this
provision would allow for post-grant review even if the time frame
of nine months has expired."
The STOP Act also expands the definition of business method
patents for the purposes of the transitional program. The notes in §
321 currently read that a business method patent is a patent that
claims "a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data
processing or other operations used in the practice, administration,
66. Id.
67. Issa and Chu Introduce Bipartisan Bill to Protect Innovators from
Frivolous Patent Litigation, DARRELL ISSA, http://issa.house.gov/press-
releases/2013/07/issa-and-chu-introduce-bipartisan-bill-to-protect-innovators-
from-frivolous-patent-litigation (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
68. .H.R. 2766, 113th Cong. (2013).
69. Id. § 2(a). Section 321 introduces a "post grant review" process where
third parties can initiate a review of a patent's validity. 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2012).
Further, § 321 provides the "Business Method Transitional Program" The
current reading of 35 U.S.C. 321 contains a "sunset" provision in the notes that
would eliminate the provision 8 years after the effective date. Id.
70. Robert Gunderman et. al., Challenging Business Method Patents Under
Section 18 of the A1A, THE ROCHESTER ENGINEER, 10 (Feb. 2013), available at
http://www.patenteducation.com/images/AIASection 18_BusinessMethodL
M_Website.pdf
71. Id.
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or management of a financial product or service."72 The STOP Act
amends the definition by "striking 'a financial product' and
inserting 'an enterprise, a product.' Hence, the bill does not limit
a reviewable business method patent to a "financial product,"
which broadens the scope of what the provision covers.
The goal of the bill is to further eliminate some NPE's use of
questionable business method patents to go after big banks and
large corporations." The one-two punch of broadening the scope
what is considered a business method patent, along with making
the transitional program permanent, would eliminate a lot of future
NPE causes of action by making their patents more easily
invalidated without a defendant accumulating large litigation costs.
III. THE PATENT ABUSE REDUCTION ACT
The Patent Abuse Reduction Act ("PARA" or "Bill") was
proposed as an attempt to "deter patent litigation abusers without
prejudicing the rights of responsible intellectual property
holders."" The PARA was introduced by Sen. John Comyn [R-
TX] in the Senate on May 22, 2013 as S.1013. 6 The bill was
cosponsored by Sen. Charles Grassley [R-IA] and referred to
Committee on the Judiciary on the same day.
The purpose of the PARA is "to amend Title 35, United States
Code, to add procedural requirements for patent infringement
suits."" Specifically, the act: (a) sets new pleading requirements;
72. 35 U.S.C. § 321 (West 2012).
73. Stopping the Offensive Use of Patents Act ["STOP Act"], H.R. 2766,
113th Cong. (2013).
74. Id. For example, in the mid-2000s, NPE "Data Treasury," earned $350
million in licensing revenue from asserting a patent for secure check image
capture and storage. Id.
75. Cornyn Introduces Bill to Curb Abusive Patent Litigation, JOHN
CORNYN,
http://www.cornyn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=InNews&ContentRecord-id
=082eaecc-1983-41a7-b656-156clb4b77cb (last visited July 27, 2013).
76. S. 1013 (113th): Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 2013, GovTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/ 13/sl013 (last visited July 13, 2013).
77. Id.
78. Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2013).
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(b) expands joinder of "Interested Parties"; (c) sets new discovery
limits; and (d) expands the awarding of costs and expenses in a
patent infringement suit.7"
A. Pleading Requirements
Section 2 of the Bill seeks to amend 29 U.S.C. § 281 by adding
several new pleading requirements for patent infringement suits."
Specifically, the Bill requires plaintiffs to include in the initial
complaint, each patent that is being asserted and each specific
patent claim that is being infringed."' Further, the plaintiff is
required to identify each accused product and state the specific
name and model number associated with that product.8 2 The
plaintiff must also have to explain, element by element, how the
accused device infringes on each claim.8 3
Additionally, the plaintiff is required to plead specific details
about the parties alleging infringement.84 The initial pleadings
must contain a description of the principal business of the party
alleging infringement, a list of all complaints filed that assert the
relevant patent(s), and whether the patent is subject to any
licensing." Further, the party alleging infringement must disclose
the identity of all owners and co-owners, assignees and licensees
of the patent(s) being litigated.86 Finally, the party alleging
infringement must also identify all persons who have the legal
79. Id.
80. Id. § 2.
8 1. Id. § 2(a).
82. Id. The Act does not limit this disclosure to "products;" the plaintiff
would have to plead the same amount of specificity for each accused "apparatus,
product, feature, device, method, system, process, function, act, service, or other
instrumentality." Id
83. Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, 113th Cong., § 2(a) (2013). The
plaintiff would have to explain whether the device infringes literally or under
the doctrine of equivalents. See id. Further, the plaintiff must show how, with
detailed specificity, each claim corresponds to the functionality of the accused
device. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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right to enforce the patent and all persons who have a financial
stake in the outcome of the litigation."
Notably, the PARA would also require the Supreme Court to
amend Form 18 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
conform to the Act."
B. Joinder
The PARA seeks to expand on the newly enacted joinder
provisions found in the America Invents Act. Section 3 of the
PARA adds another section to 35 U.S.C. § 299: Joinder of
Interested Parties." However, the provisions in the PARA build
upon the joinder provisions in the America Invents Act in that the
PARA focuses on the defendant's ability to join more plaintiffs to
the litigation."o Specifically, a defendant may join any "interested
party" (as defined by section 2 of the PARA) to the suit if that
party's interest is limited to "asserting any such patent in
litigation." 9' A law firm cannot be joined if their only interest is
representing the party alleging infringement.9 2 The defendant's
motion to join an interested party would not be granted if a) the
party is not subject to service of process; or b) joining the party
would "deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction or make
venue improper." 93
87. Id. The party alleging infringement would also have to disclose all
agreements with the parties with have a financial stake. Id.
88. Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, 113th Cong., § 2(c) (2013).
89. Id. § 3.
90. Id.
91. Id. According to § 2, an "Interested Person" is "any person other than the
party alleging infringement who A) owns or co-owns [the patent]; B) is the
assignee of [the patent]; or C) is an exclusive licensee to [the patent]." Patent
Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, 113th Cong., § 2 (2013). An "interested person"
is can also be "any person with a direct financial interest in the outcome of the
action, including a right to receive proceeds or any fixed or variable portion
thereof. Id.
92. Id.
93. Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, 113th Cong., § 3 (2013).
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C. Discovery Limits
Section 4, "[d]iscovery in patent infringement suits," is the
Bill's longest and most expansive section.9 4 This section seeks to
add a new section (§300) to Chapter 29 of Title 35 of the United
States Code.9 5
The first section of the new discovery provision focuses on
"Discovery Limitation[s] Prior to Claim Construction.96
Specifically, if a court determines that a hearing on claim
construction is required, discovery will be limited to "information
necessary for the court to determine the meaning of the terms used
in the patent claim."97 The Bill makes an exception for discovery
in cases where a resolution within a specified period of time is
required and a party's rights with respect to the patent would be in
danger because of that period of time.98 The Bill also provides an
exception for discovery that is necessary to resolve a motion made
by a party prior to the ruling relating to claim construction.9 9
The Bill then goes on to discuss "Sequence and Scope; Cost-
Shifting," making a distinction between "core documentary
evidence" and "additional discovery.""oo A detailed list is set forth
describing what can be core documentary evidence, while
additional discovery is simply defined as anything that is not core
documentary evidence."' Core documentary evidence only
includes documents that:
(I) relate to the conception, reduction to practice,
and application for the asserted patent; (II) are
sufficient to show the technical operation of the
instrumentality identified in the complaint as
94. Id. § 4.
95. Id. § 4(a).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, 113th Cong., § 4(a) (2013). The
Bill specifically mentions the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act as an exception. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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infringing the asserted patent; (III) relate to
potentially invalidating prior art; (IV) relate to
previous licensing or conveyances of the asserted
patent; (V) are sufficient to show revenue
attributable to any claimed invention; (VI) are
sufficient to show the organizational ownership and
structure of each party, including identification of
any person that has a financial interest in the
asserted patent; (VII) relate to awareness of the
asserted patent or claim, or the infringement, before
the action was filed; and (VIII) sufficient to show
any marking, lack of marking, or notice of the
asserted patent provided to the accused infringer.'0 2
The Bill specifically mentions that core documentary evidence
does not include any sort of electronic communication or computer
code unless that court finds good cause to allow the evidence.'0 3
Additionally, during the pre-trial conference, parties in a patent
suit are required to disclose (1) when discovery of core
documentary evidence will be completed; (2) whether a party will
seek additional discovery; and (3) any issues relating to
infringement, invalidity, or damages that would "streamline the
case."' 04  The PARA dictates that a party seeking additional
discovery would have to bear all costs associated with that
discovery, including attorney's fees. os Further, the party seeking
additional discovery would be required to either pay the
anticipated costs associated with the discovery up front, or post a
bond of the same amount.'10
The PARA's section on discovery ends with a disclaimer stating
that nothing in the discovery section should be construed to allow
a party to obtain information that is not otherwise discoverable and
102. Id.
103. Id. § 4(a). Electronic communication includes e-mail, text messages,
instant messaging, and other forms of electronic communication. Id.
104. Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, 113th Cong., § 4(a) (2013).
105. Id.
106. Id.
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will not permit a party to obtain otherwise privileged
information.'0 7
D. Costs and Expenses
The final section of the PARA amends Section 285 of Title 35
of the United States Code."0 s As previously mentioned, § 285
currently reads: "The court in exceptional cases may award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party."' 09 The PARA
would amend this section to state that, in patent litigation there is a
presumption that costs, expenses and attorney's fees will be
awarded (1) unless the conduct of the non-prevailing party was
reasonable and substantially justified, or (2) if there are
exceptional circumstances."' Courts are directed not to look at
any licenses taken to settle a claim when determining if the non-
prevailing party was within one of the exceptions."' The Bill ends
by stating that if the non-prevailing party is unable to pay the
costs, expenses, and attorney's fees, the court may make that
amount recoverable against a previously defined "interested
party."' 12
IV. ANALYSIS
This section will detail the four main segments of the Patent
Abuse Reduction Act ("PARA"): Pleading Requirements, Joinder,
Discovery, and Attorney's Fees and Costs. When applied, each of
the proposed sections will have an effect on the patent system that
is not readily apparent from a first read of the text of the bill. This
section will detail these effects and the different arguments for and
against legislation like the PARA that try to curtail the litigation
efforts of a non-practicing entity ("NPE").
107. Id.
108. Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, § 5(a).
109. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (West 2012)
110. Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, § 5(a).
111. Id.
112. Id.
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A. Pleading Requirements
The filing of litigation can be a very powerful bargaining tool in
licensing negotiations. NPEs will often file suit with no intention
of actually serving the defendant or follow through with the case,
but instead solely to use the now more imminent threat of litigation
to gain leverage over a defendant in a licensing negotiation. Most
companies cannot afford the liability of a pending lawsuit against
them and often will have to quickly assess the cost of litigating the
claim compared to the cost of a settlement or license."' The
PARA attempts to curtail this practice by changing the pleading
requirement standard for patent infringement cases in order to
make the filing of litigation more costly.
The PARA's proposed pleading requirements drastically change
the current procedure by forcing the pleader to include specific
details about the alleged infringement(s) and the parties involved
in the suit."4 These new pleading requirements would affect NPEs
by (1) raising the cost of litigation by forcing NPEs to investigate
potential infringement more thoroughly, and (2) making NPE shell
companies more transparent by requiring the disclosure of its
parent company.
1. The Pleading Requirement's Effect on Litigation Cost
The PARA's requirement of forcing the pleader to disclose,
claim element by claim element, the scope of the defendant's
device's infringement, can be interpreted as an attempt to increase
initial litigation costs in order to decrease the amount of "nuisance
cases" filed by NPEs. Currently, because of the current pleading
standard discussed in Part II Section, it is not very expensive for a
113. See Jonathan Moore, Particularizing Patent Pleading: Pleading Patent
Infringement in a Post-Twombly World, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 451, 463
(2010) (noting that "even if the alleged infringement pertains only to a
component, if the overall product is a technology that requires significant
investment, customers will be wary of making that investment because of the
pending suit").
114. . Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, § 2(a).
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NPE, or really any other patent plaintiff, to file a patent litigation
suit."'
While the initial costs of filing a suit are low for plaintiffs, the
suit's starting costs are inversely high for defendants.'16 When a
plaintiff is not required to plead specific infringement contentions,
a defendant is left to blindly access the merits of the claim without
knowing what product is allegedly infringing and how it
potentially infringes."'7 Consequently, this makes the defendant's
initial investigation into whether the defendant should proceed
with the litigation or enter into settlement negations a costly
process because they must examine all of their property to
determine the nature and scope of the alleged infringement."'
Even if a defendant chooses to pay to investigate the merits, the
decision of how to proceed with an effective defense (e.g.,
invalidity or non-infringement) is nearly impossible to evaluate in
the short time frame available to answer a complaint, so the
defendant often simply settles such vaguely pleaded "nuisance
suits.""'
The PARA's pleading disclosure provisions would shift the
current cost burden at the initiation of a patent infringement suits
by increasing the cost of filing an infringement suit for a plaintiff
and decreasing the cost of defending such a suit at the initial
pleading stage. The plaintiff would be required to detail the
accused devices down to the specific "name or model number."' 20
This one detail would allow for a defendant to more quickly assess
the merits of the plaintiff s claim, thus reducing attorney's fees and
other costs associated with initial litigation investigation. The
heightened disclosure provisions from the PARA would likewise
increase the cost of filing litigation for plaintiffs, specifically
NPEs, because NPEs traditionally sue a large number of
defendants with very vague infringement contentions in their
115. Jonathan Moore, Particularizing Patent Pleading: Pleading Patent
Infringement in a Post-Twombly World, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 451, 485
(2010).
116. Id. at 486-87.
117. Id. at 187.
118. Id.
119. Id. 187-88.
120. Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, § 2(a).
388
22
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 5
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol24/iss2/5
2014] ANOTHER ATTEMPTATPATENT REFORM
complaint. Requiring disclosure of each claim element
specifically infringed, or a "claim chart," would increase a NPEs
costs before filing suit since a more thorough investigation will
have to take place before a lawsuit is filled. For example, a NPE
may have to hire a scientist or engineer to dismantle and
understand a product so that infringement contentions could be
properly pleaded. This increased initial cost means that NPEs will
have to either spend more money on attorney's fees and experts to
create claim charts or simply file less infringement suits in general.
But it is also important to note that the benefits mentioned above
would only be realized during the initial pleading stages of
litigation. This is due to the fact that most Districts' local patent
rules require a claim chart to be submitted to the defendant
immediately after an answer is filed in the plaintiffs initial
infringement contentions.12 ' If a defendant can obtain enough
information to answer the complaint and wait for the initial
disclosures to seriously investigate a case, the defendant would be
able to save time and money in the long run, because rather than
investigating the infringement themselves, defendants could wait
for the plaintiffs claim charts/initial contentions. The PARA
provides a limited technical change by simply moving the
disclosure to an earlier point in the suit.
2. The Pleading Requirement's Effect on Non-Practicing Entity 's
Transparency
The other notable provision in the PARA's pleading
requirements section is the provision requiring the pleader to
disclose the identity of anyone who has a stake in the investigation
and the nature of their stake.'22 This is solely aimed at larger NPEs
121. See, e.g., N.D. Ill. L.P.R 2.2(a)-(h) (requiring, among other things, "a
chart identifying specifically where each element of each asserted claim is found
within each Accused Instrumentality, including for each element that such party
contends is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112(6), a description of the claimed
function of that element and the identity of the structure(s), act(s), or material(s)
in the Accused Instrumentality that performs the claimed function" within 14
days after initial disclosures); E.D. Tex. P.R. 3-1 (containing a similar
provision).
122. Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, § 2(a).
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and their strategy to use large amounts of shell companies to
pursue litigation. In effect, this provision, along with the other
provisions of the PARA, would make that practice obsolete
because once the parent NPE is disclosed, that company can be
joined under the PARA's joinder provisions (discussed infra
Section IV, Part B). After the parent NPE is disclosed and
subsequently joined, it could be held liable if a judgment for say,
attorney's fees, is entered, as it has the capital to pay the judgment
that the subsidiary does not. Essentially, the PARA's heightened
pleading requirements would not be effective in reducing NPE
lawsuits without the PARA's joinder provisions.
B. Joinder Provisions
As discussed earlier, a typical NPE strategy is to use a shell
company to buy and enforce a patent.123 The attorney that
represents the NPE shell company will usually front the costs of
litigation and work on a contingency fee basis.'24 This means that,
to operate, the shell company's only asset would need to be the
patent(s) being enforced, thus making the entity 'judgment proof'
because they have no monetary assets.125
This section, along with the "Pleading Requirements" (discussed
supra Section IV, Part A) and "Attorney's Fees and Costs"
section (discussed infra Section IV, Part C), would eliminate the
usefulness of the NPE shell company structure because the parent
NPE will be easily enjoined to the litigation, making it vulnerable
to a 35 U.S.C. § 285 ruling or a ruling associated with the "loser
pays" portion of the PARA (discussed infra). Essentially, the
PARA's joinder provisions will no longer allow a NPE to hide
behind the "corporate veil." If the large, parent NPE is joined to
the suit, it can be held responsible for attorney's fees and costs, as
well as sanctions if the court decides to award them. Currently, if
123. See supra Section II, Part B.2
124. Peter Schechter, Guest Editorial: Throwing Trolls off the Bridge,
PATENTLYO, (Sep. 19, 2013, 3:23 PM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/guest-editorial-throwing-trolls-off-
the-bridge.html.
12 5. Id.
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these judgments are entered against the shell company, the entity
simply declares bankruptcy and dissolves, giving a defendant no
recourse to collect his court awarded attorney's fees and costs or
sanctions for a meritless case.
C. Discovery
Generally, parties in any litigation will serve each other with
broad discovery requests in order to obtain as much information as
possible to build the strongest case. Patent infringement suits are
no exception.'26 Discovery requests in patent infringement suits
often involve a large number of highly technical documents that
require a large staff or teams of attorneys to sort through.12 7
Further, because of the complex technical nature of patent cases,
attorneys often have trouble sorting important documents from
unimportant ones and cannot tell what is important until deep into
the discovery process, creating inefficiencies of time and money.128
NPEs have a particular advantage in discovery proceedings
because of their use of shell companies and because, by their very
nature, they do not practice the invention associated with the
asserted patent. A NPE shell company, whose only asset is the
patent-in-suit, is structured to only have a limited amount of
information available to divulge in discovery. 129 Whereas when a
practicing entity is subject to very broad discovery requests, they
have significantly more documents and information, ranging from
technical specifications to company financials, for each device or
product they manufacture. 3 0 Therefore, NPEs can purposely
impose large and expensive discovery requests against practicing
126. See William T. Gallagher, IP Legal Ethics in the Everyday Practice of
Law: An Empirical Perspective on Patent Litigators, 10 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 309, 310-11 (2011) (noting that patent litigators are particularly
aggressive when it comes to discovery requests because the cases are generally
high stakes suits).
127. Id. at 325-26.
128. Id. at 327.
129. Sid Venkatesan, Examining the Effects of Patent Troll Legislation on
Startups, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 2, 2013, 12:31 PM),
http://www.techcrunch.com/2013/effects-of-patent-troll-legislation-on-startups.
130. Id.
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entities without having to worry about the same thing being done
to them.13 The PARA attempts to combat this strategy in several
ways.
1. The Pre-Markman Hearing Discovery Limits
The first section of the PARA's discovery provisions limits pre-
claim construction discovery to only articles that are relevant to
claim construction. On its face, this provision would substantially
limit abusive discovery because there is, in theory, a much
narrower set of documents that are relevant to claim construction
than documents relevant to all issues that arise in a patent
infringement suit (infringement, invalidity, etc.). Moreover, a
defendant would be better positioned to get the case to a claim
construction Markman hearing at a much lower cost because a
NPE will not be able to make large, costly, and unrelated
discovery requests before the hearing.'32
There are many advantages to getting a suit to a Markman
hearing. The first, in the NPE context, is narrowing down the
scope of the claim, which is essential to winning a patent
infringement suit. As stated earlier, NPEs generally acquire
extremely broad patents so that they can assert them against a large
amount of defendants. If a defendant takes a NPE to a Markman
hearing, there is a high probably that the NPE's patent it claims to
be infringed does not actually read as broadly as the NPE
contends. Chances are the defendant will be able to escape the
lawsuit after a Markman hearing for a very low settlement, or, in
some cases, can demonstrate that their device is outside the scope
of the claim and prevail in a summary judgment motion.
The pre-Markman hearing discovery limits will also have a
positive effect on current and future defendants that are not
participating in the specific infringement suit. If any particular
131. Id.
132. A party generally has 30 days to respond to a discovery request. See,
e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A) ("The party to whom the request is directed
must respond in writing within 30 days after being served"). If a NPE were to
file large discovery requests just after defendant's answer, the discovery would
have to be complied with well before a Markman hearing would be scheduled.
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defendant decides to bring a case to a Markman hearing, all other
defendants will benefit from the judge's claim interpretation
because of issue preclusion and preclusion of inconsistent
positions.'33 Essentially, these two doctrines will set the narrower
terms of a NPE's patent claim into stone, which a future defendant
may be able to use to preclude the litigation all together by
showing non-infringement based off a claim's previous Markman
hearing interpretation.'3 4 However, this strategy will only work if
the claim construction was "essential to the final judgment" of the
case, as required by the doctrine of issue preclusion.' For
example, if a defendant were to get a favorable ruling on claim
construction and won the case on summary judgment, the doctrine
would apply. However, if the defendant obtained a favorable
claim construction ruling and the NEP simply dropped the suit or
agreed to a very small settlement, the doctrine would not apply
because while the ruling may have been essential to the outcome, a
settlement is not a judgment for issue preclusion purposes.136
Therefore, in order for the pre-Markman hearing discovery limits
133. See Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective
Strategy Against Patent Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH,
L.J. 159, 174 (2006); see also Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5
(1979) (stating that issue preclusion or collateral estoppel bars a suit if the issue
or cause of action has already been "actually litigated"). Further, collateral
estoppel has "the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of
relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting
judicial economy by preventing needless litigation." Id. at 326. Additionally,
preclusion of inconsistent positions occurs when a litigant, as the name suggests,
take a position different from the one he took in an earlier trial. See, e.g.,
Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser American Corp., 747 F.2d 1567, 1578 (Fed. Cir.
1984). Generally, a court will see if the defendant was prejudiced in relying on
the earlier position to bar a litigant's suit. Id. at 1580.
134. See Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective
Strategy Against Patent Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH,
L.J. 159, 174 (2006).
135. Id.
136. See RF Delaware, Inc. v. Pac. Keystone Techs., Inc., 326 F.3d 1255,
1261 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("Thus, if the parties to a suit enter into an extrajudicial
settlement or compromise, there is no judgment, and future litigation is not
barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel though, of course, a court may
dismiss litigation thereafter filed on the same claim on the basis that the parties
have by contract ended their controversy").
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to have maximum effect on abusive infringement suits, defendants
will have to use summary judgment motions to dispose of suits,
rather than less expensive settlement negotiations.
Also, a claim construction ruling on a patent will still give
defendants a good idea of the best way to design a product around
a NPE's claim(s). While this would not shield the defendant from
any damages from previously infringing products, it could mitigate
the damages enough to where the NPE's patent will not be as
valuable as it once was, causing the entity not to assert it anymore.
While the pre-Markman hearing discovery limits would
streamline a case and eventually curtail abusive patent litigation, it
will also inevitably have a negative effect on plaintiffs that are
smaller companies or sole inventors who do not quite know
exactly how an accused product actually works, and, more
importantly, if it actually infringes. Some products are especially
hard to reverse engineer and a patentee of, for example, a software
patent, may have an inclination that a product on the market is
infringing but has no way of knowing for sure until he files suit.
These non-NPE plaintiffs may rely on early stage discovery in
order to quickly discern the merits of their case. The PARA would
force these smaller entities with a tighter litigation budget to pay
attorney's fees through a Markman hearing in order to find out
how the accused device actually works in post-Markman hearing
discovery.
There is also the question of what "discovery related to claim
construction" actually entails as the Act is silent on the issue. This
silence, presumably, leaves this determination up the courts, which
may create more issues and waste more time than if the provision
was not in place at all. A NPE will do anything to elongate a suit
so that defendant's attorney's fees will start to increase to the point
where it does not make fiscal sense to continue with the suit
anymore.' Therefore, without Congressional guidance, a NPE
would not mind still asking for vast amounts of discovery and
having a hearing about each and every request to determine if the
requested article fits within the scope of "discovery related to
137. Remember, NPEs generally use attorneys that work on a contingency
fee basis, covering the costs of litigation up front in order to take a percentage of
a settlement or verdict, discussed earlier in Part B of this article.
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claim construction." Over time, there would be case law that
would make this process more efficient, but there will always be
new things requested, further stalling the litigation process, which
puts pressure on a defendant to settle due to mounting legal fees.
2. Post-Markman Hearing Limits and Cost Shifting
The PARA also dictates that discovery after claim construction
will be limited to "core documentary evidence," and if a party
makes a discovery request that is outside the scope of "core
documentary evidence," that party will bear the cost of
production.13 8 Here, the PARA is trying to specifically limit a
common tactic of all patent litigators to request hundreds of
thousands of pages of emails in order to find anything that could
be useful for the litigation.'3 9 In a typical practicing entity versus
practicing entity suit, these types of requests would be issued
regularly by both sides in order to "uncover every stone" for their
client. However, in a NPE situation, a NPE shell can issue these
types of requests and not have to worry about having to produce
the same type of documents because the documents simply do not
exist.140 The PARA would level the playing field by placing the
cost burden on the NPE if it is inclined to continue to employ this
tactic.
D. Attorney's Fees and Costs
The PARA's final section creates a more useful "loser pays"
system for awarding attorney's costs and fees upon completion of
litigation. 4 ' Currently, 35 U.S.C. § 285 states that attorney's fees
and costs are only to be awarded in patent litigation if the
138. Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, § 4(a).
139. William T. Gallagher, IP Legal Ethics in the Everyday Practice ofLaw:
An Empirical Perspective on Patent Litigators, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 309,350 (2011).
140. See Randall Rader et. al., Make Patent Trolls Patent Trolls Pay in
Court, N.Y. TIMES, A25 (June 4, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/make-patent-trolls-pay-in-
court.html? r-0
141. Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, § 5(a).
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presiding judge believes the case is "exceptional."' 42 This section
is not used often, if at all. 4 3 In fact, judges granted a § 285 motion
to shift fees in only 20 out of 3,000 patent infringement cases filed
in 2011.'" This is because judges are inherently wary of finding
an "exceptional case" and most "nuisance cases" brought by NPEs
usually settle before a judge could even award fees.
While district court judges have extreme discretion in awarding
attorney's and costs under § 285 and Rule 11 ", most are still
hesitant to without more precedent from higher courts. 4 6 There
have been recent Federal Circuit decisions that have articulated the
standard that judges should use in awarding fees and serve as a
good example of "exceptional" conduct.'4 7 However, judges will
still feel uncomfortable awarding fees under this standard because
attorney's fees and costs can be exceptionally high in patent
litigation and place a substantial economic burden on an
unsuccessful party.'48 While the PARA's proposed guidelines of
when to award costs may persuade some judges to award fees and
142. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (West 2012).
143. Randall Rader et. al., Make Patent Trolls Patent Trolls Pay in Court,
N.Y. TIMES, A25 (June 4, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/make-patent-trolls-pay-in-
court.html? r-0 (arguing that § 285 is "flexible enough to help defend against
patent trolls").
144. Id.
145. FED. R. Civ. P. II focuses on whether an attorney has conducted a
sufficient factual investigation before making a representation to the court. If a
judge determines that a reasonable investigation was not conducted, sanctions
can be awarded. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c).
146. Gene Quinn, Defending Chief Judge Rader: Judges Can Make Patent
Trolls Pay, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 2, 2013, 2:43 PM),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/06/24/defending-chief-judge-rader-judges-
can-make-patent-trolls-pay/id=42348 (quoting a district court judge who
explains that the "exceptional case" standard is a "really high bar" and that there
is not enough appellate authority in this area to cite).
147. See, e.g., Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (awarding fees and costs under § 285 and Rule 11 because plaintiff
"failed to engage in the claim construction process in good faith" and displayed
a "cavalier attitude" toward the "patent litigation process as a whole").
148. See, e.g., Monolithic Power Sys. v. 02 Micro Int'l Ltd., 726 F.3d 1359,
at 1366-68 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (awarding $8.4 million in attorney's fees because of
plaintiff's "vexatious litigation strategy").
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costs more liberally, it is not clear that it would actually increase
the frequency of awarding costs to the non-prevailing party.
As discussed earlier, NPEs use shell companies with no assets
other than the asserted patent to litigate. 9 A defendant would
never be able to collect from a NPE shell company if a court did
apply Rule 11 sanctions or a grant a § 285 fee shifting order in any
particular case. But the PARA allows for the costs to be shifted to
an interested party affiliated with the non-prevailing party, which,
in the case of if a NPE shell was the losing party, would typically
be the parent company that has more financial assets than the shell
used in the litigation. But the Bill provides no explanation of how
and to which party the cost would shift, and the parent NPEs
would vehemently object to bearing these costs. Therefore, while
the provision sounds effective and opens the door for more
opportunities, in practice the court's willingness to award fees and
costs in patent litigation would most likely remain as it currently is
unless there is more controlling precedent that would authorize
more liberal fee shifting.
E. A Different Perspective: Opponents of the Act
The arguments presented by the most talked about perspective,
proponents of the PARA and regulating NPE litigation, are
discussed above. Generally, they argue that most NPEs hinder
innovation and their use of patent litigation to "tax" businesses
should be severely reduced or eliminated. The most active
proponents of NPE regulation are interest groups like the
Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF") and the Computer and
Communications Industry Association ("CCIA"). Both
organizations believe that patent trolls are stifling innovation and
push for regulation of them.5 0
149. Discussed earlier in Part B of this article.
150. See Patent Trolls, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Oct. 28, 2013,
10:08 AM), https://www.eff.org/issues/resources-patent-troll-victims ("we've
watched as the [patent] system appears to fall apart, harming innovation, the
very thing it was designed to foster"); Patents, COMPUTER & COMMUNICATIONS
INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION (Oct. 28, 2013, 10:17 AM),
http://www.ccianet.org/issues/patents ("CCIA has advocated a wide range of
reforms to the U.S. patent system"). Also, in an attempt to promote
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There is another perspective; however, that does not get as much
attention: NPEs can enormously benefit small companies and
individual inventors and any attempt to regulate them "would tilt
an already unbalanced playing field to further benefit large
corporations in the information technology industries."'
Essentially, the PARA's opponent's argument is that the patent
system was designed to encourage innovation, and a large portion
of that innovation is done by individual inventors and small
companies who do not have the resources to "practice" their
patents and need monetary incentives to keep innovating and
contributing to society.'52 Proponents of this argument include the
NPEs themselves and organizations like the Innovation Alliance,
which is generally comprised of businesses and NPEs that
regularly enforce their patents.'
The premise of NPE's supporter's argument focuses helping an
inventor, who is not particularly interested in litigation, monetize
his patents.'54 For example, a typical start-up company may only
have a couple of employees and a few patent assets. That
company would not be in the financial position to manufacture
whatever device that their patent covers in a way that would
transparency themselves, the EFF has created a website that allows "victims" of
patent trolling to upload pre-suit demand letters received from NPEs. See
Trolling Effects (Oct. 28, 2013, 10:24 AM), www.trollingeffects.org.
151. Peter Detkin, Leveling the Patent Playing Field, 6 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 636, 636-37 (2007).
152. Id. at 637 (stating that "[d]uring the 1990s forty-three percent of all
patent application filed in the U.S. by American inventors originated from small
entities: individuals, small businesses, and non-profit organizations"); see
Abusive Patent Litigation: The Impact on American Innovation and Jobs, and
Potential Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Courts, Intellectual
Property, and the Internet of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 51-54
(2013) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of C. Graham Gerst, Partner, Global IP
Law Group) available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/ll3th/l 13-
13_79880.PDF.
153. See About, Innovation Alliance (Oct. 28, 2013, 10:54 AM),
http://innovationalliance.net/about/about-us (believing in the "critical
importance of maintaining a strong patent system that supports innovative
enterprises of all sizes"). The Innovation Alliance features members like
QUALCOMM (an operating company) and InterDigital (a NPE). Id.
154. Hearings, 113th Cong. 51-54 (2013) (statement of C. Graham Gerst).
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overcome market barriers to enter and compete with large scale
corporations. Therefore, a life-giving strategy for the company
would be to license their patent to make some revenue to keep the
business alive and growing.'" This extra revenue could go into
more research and development, thus promoting more innovation
and generating additional revenue so that, one day, the company
would have the financial means to compete with the big players in
the market.15 6 The problem, however, is that these small
companies lack bargaining power to effectively negotiate with
larger companies because they do not have the capital to back up a
licensing demand with litigation.' This is where, it is argued,
NPEs play a valuable role. A large NPE can buy a smaller
company's patent, giving that company instant capital to help it
grow and innovate. This, in a sense, levels the playing field
because a large NPE is usually backed by a myriad of investors
and does not mind getting involved in large scale litigation."
Therefore, as NPE supporters put it, the NPE can do the litigating
and the inventor can get back to doing what he is best at and "truly
loves": inventing.'59 Supporters argue that NPEs provide incentive
for innovation by creating an accessible market for inventors and
start-up companies to monetize their patents so that they can get
quickly grow their business by reinvesting the profits obtained by
a patent sale.'60
Another argument employed by the opposition to regulating
NPEs is that the patent system is very fragile and sweeping
regulation would always have untended consequences that would
negatively affect the rights of patent owners. 6 ' For example, if the
cost of filing a suit is heightened (e.g., heightened pleading
requirements), some patent owners would not be able to cover the
cost of filing litigation to enforce their patents, essentially
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. (noting that smaller companies cannot justify spending $3-7 million
dollars on a patent infringement suit).
158. Detkin, supra note 148, at 640.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Hearings, supra note 154 (statement of C. Graham Gerst).
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rendering their patent useless through an inability to enforce.'6 2
Further, Congress should wait to see how current provisions, like
provisions in the AIA, will actually play out in practice before
more action is taken.163
V. CONCLUSION
The Patent Abuse Reduction Act ("PARA" or "Bill") should not
be passed as currently proposed. It is far too sweeping of a
measure and would, as the opponents of regulation claim,
inevitably have far too many unintended consequences that would
hinder the rights of patent holders. Heightened pleading
requirements would bar good faith suits of patentees who simply
do not know enough information about a potentially infringing
product to plead sufficiently. Also, even if the plaintiff had
enough information survive a motion to dismiss, the discovery
procedures do not adequately define "discovery relating to claim
construction," which would lead to longer, and therefore more
costly, litigation for defendants. At the end of the day, the Bill's
fatal defect is that while it would make it costlier for a non-
practicing entity (" NPE") to litigate, it also prohibits good faith
patent owners from enforcing their patents through litigation.
However, there are some provisions in the Bill that would be
very effective at curtailing NPE abuse. Specifically, the provisions
that affect transparency would make a NPE think twice about
bringing a meritless suit. If a bill with provisions that mirror the
PARA's transparency sections in the pleading requirements and
joinder provisions were passed, parent NPEs would be on the hook
for an attorney's fee judgment or sanctions award, rather than
simply bankrupting a shell company and hiding behind a
"corporate veil." Also, a judge may be more inclined to award
attorney's fees or sanctions if he knows that such an award could
actually be enforced against a party.
The PARA's "loser pays" provision is another provision that
could also have an immediate impact on whether a NPE would
162. This also ties in with the argument that, if a patent owner cannot afford
litigation, he could still sell his patent to a NPE to enforce it for him.
163. Id.
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bring a meritless case because attorney's fees in a patent suit are
particularly expensive and having to cover that cost for both
parties would severely endanger a NPE's business operations.
However, for such a provision to matter, defendants would still
have to either take the case to trial or some other form of official
adjudication for the judge to give the award. Even with the new
"loser pays" system, defendants would still be hesitant to take on
the risk of litigating to this stage and not win fees and costs
because of the excessive amount. Therefore, many defendants
would stick to the status quo and simply settle NPE "nuisance
cases" at the first available opportunity in order to minimize their
losses. While a "loser pays" system sounds effective, as proposed
the system would simply not work because the large cost of patent
litigation would still make an accused infringer hesitant to take a
case to trial.
The current § 285 and Rule 11 provisions could be enough to
substantially curtail patent litigation abuse. If courts were more
liberal in awarding fees or sanctions, NPEs would be incentivized
to only bring claims with merit. Also, as previously mentioned in
this article, NPEs usually employ lawyers who work on a
contingency fee basis.'" This serves as an additional check on
meritless cases, because an attorney would presumably not take on
the risk of a case that he does not feel strongly about if there is a
high possibility of not being paid.' 5
Patent litigation abuse is a very complex problem. In fact, it
may just be too complex to solve. The bottom line is that the
United States has always favored a strong patent system.'66 While
such a system produces strong innovation incentives,
unfortunately, such a strong patent system also provides for forms
of abuse. Thought the PARA includes a number of good changes,
164. See Section II Part B of this article.
165. Raymond P. Niro, Who is Really Undermining the Patent System -
"Patent Trolls " or Congress?, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 185, 197
(2007).
166. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The clause states that "[t]he Congress
shall have to power . .. to promote the progress of the science and useful arts by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries." Id.
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Congress must pass other bills with less sweeping regulations in
order to one day create a more manageable situation.
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